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Why do people think artists are special? It's just another job.1
I. INTRODUCTION
In 1958, Robert Rauschenberg created a painting titled Thaw. Soon
afterward, he sold Thaw to prominent art collectors Robert and Ethel Scull for
$900. In 1973, the Sculls sold Thaw at auction for $85,000. After the auction, a
rueful Rauschenberg confronted Robert Scull: “I’ve been working my ass off
for you to make that profit.” Scull replied, “How about yours. You’re going to
sell now. I’ve been working for you too. We work for each other.”2 Soon
afterward, Rauschenberg began campaigning for the creation of a federal resale
royalty right. As he explained, “From now on, I want a royalty on the resales,
and I am going to get it.”3

Andy Warhol, THE PHILOSOPHY OF ANDY WARHOL 178 (1975).
Edward Jeffrey Vaughn, America’s Pop Collector: Robert C. Scull; contemporary art at
auction (1990) (unpublished dissertation) (describing the production of the 1974 documentary
film by E.J. Vaughn, entitled America’s Pop Collector: Robert C. Scull – Contemporary Art at Auction and
including a transcript). See also Jeffrey C. Wu, Art Resale Rights and the Art Resale Market: A Followup Study, 46 J. COPYRIGHT SOC’Y U.S.A. 531, 531 (1998–1999) (stating that Rauschenberg also
said, “The least you could do is send every artist in this auction free taxis for a week.” Robert and
Ethel Scull owned the Super Operating Corporation, a fleet of 130 cabs operated by 400 drivers.
(quoting Roger Ricklees, Artists Decide They Should Share Profits On Resale of Paintings, WALL ST. J.,
Feb. 11, 1974, at 1)). See also Christopher Rauschenberg, Artists Deserve Royalties Too, HUFFINGTON
POST (July 15, 2014, 2:53 PM), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/christopher-rauschenberg/artis
ts-deserve-royalties_b_5588388.html. According to art critic Irving Sandler, Rauschenberg was
angry and shouted at Scull, “Kiss me — I like to be kissed when I’m being fucked.” GEORGINA
ADAM, BIG BUCKS: THE EXPLOSION OF THE ART MARKET IN THE 21ST CENTURY 33 (2014). But
see Marion Maneker, The Famous Rauschenberg Scull Shoving Match Didn’t Go Down the Way You Think
It Did, ART MARKET MONITOR, Sept. 2, 2014, http://www.artmarketmonitor.com/2014/09/02/
the-famous-rauschenberg-scull-shoving-match-didnt-go-down-the-way-you-think-it-did/.
3 Wu, supra note 2, at 531.
1
2
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Robert Rauschenberg, Thaw (1958)
A “resale royalty right” or droit de suite (resale right) is a legal right that gives
certain artists the right to claim a percentage of the resale price of the artworks
they created.4 The Berne Convention for the Protection of Literary and Artistic
Works5 and the Tunis Model Law on Copyright for Developing Countries6
provide for an optional resale royalty right. Many countries have created a
resale royalty right, although the particulars of the right differ from country to
country. But the United States has repeatedly declined to create a federal resale
royalty right, and a federal court recently held that a resale royalty right created
by California is preempted by federal law.7 However, the United States
Copyright Office recently recommended the creation of a federal resale royalty
right, and Congress has considered new bills to create such a right.8

Resale Royalty Right, U.S. COPYRIGHT OFFICE, http://www.copyright.gov/docs/resaleroyalty.
Berne Convention for the Protection of Literacy and Artistic Works, art. 14ter, Sept. 9, 1986,
102 Stat. 2853, 161 U.N.T.S. 30, http://www.wipo.int/treaties/en/ip/berne/.
6 TUNIS MODEL LAW ON COPYRIGHT FOR DEVELOPING COUNTRIES, reprinted in COPYRIGHT
BULL. Vol. 10, 1702, at 10 (1976), http://portal.unesco.org/culture/en/files/31318/1186663505
3tunis_model_law_en-web.pdf/tunis_model_law_en-web.pdf.
7 Estate of Graham v. Sotheby’s, Inc., 178 F. Supp. 3d 974, 988 (C.D. Cal. 2016) (holding that
a state resale royalty statute was preempted by both the first sale doctrine and the preemption
provision of the Copyright Act).
8 See U.S. Copyright Office, Resale Royalties: An Updated Analysis (Dec. 2013). See, e.g.,
American Royalties Too Act of 2014, S. 2045, 113th Cong. (2014).
4
5
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Commentators disagree about the justification of the resale royalty right.
Supporters argue that equity entitles artists to a resale royalty right, which also
encourages the production of artwork and protects artists from exploitation.
Opponents argue that the resale royalty right is both inequitable and inefficient,
because it benefits successful artists at the expense of unsuccessful artists by
lowering prices on the primary market, and cannot provide a salient incentive
for economically rational artists to produce more artwork.
This Article assumes that the purpose of the resale royalty right is to increase
the equity and efficiency of the art market, and asks how to create an equitable
and efficient resale royalty system. It considers several different potential
models for the collection and distribution of resale royalties, including a private
right of action, resale royalty organizations, and federal taxation. It concludes
that the most equitable and efficient model would be a “resale royalty tax,”
distributed either to the National Endowment for the Arts (NEA) or on a
progressive basis to unsuccessful artists.
II. A BRIEF HISTORY OF THE RESALE ROYALTY RIGHT
The resale royalty right is based on the premise that artists have an equitable
right to share in the increase in value of the artworks they created. It emerged
as a concept in the late nineteenth century, as increasing private wealth enabled
the creation of an art market, in which certain artworks with a recognized
pedigree became remarkably valuable. Artists were dismayed to realize that
others were profiting from the sale of artworks they created and began
searching for a way to share in the increased value of those artworks.9
Under nineteenth century French property law, the droit de suite or “resale
right” provided that a mortgage on real property survived the transfer of the
property to a third party.10 In 1893, Albert Vaunois argued that the droit de suite
should be extended to give artists a resale royalty right in their artwork.11 His
argument resonated with a widely held belief that artists struggled to support
themselves and were exploited by the art market. For example, Giacomo
Puccini’s wildly popular 1896 opera La bohème opened with a scene of starving

9 At least apocryphally, the idea of a resale royalty right originated in the 1889 sale of Jean
Francois Millet’s painting “L’Angélus” (1859) for 553,000 francs. At the time, Millet was dead
and his family was destitute. See Tiernan Morgan & Lauren Purje, An Illustrated Guide to Artist
Resale Royalties (aka ‘Droit de Suite’), HYPERALLERGIC, Oct. 24, 2014, http://hyperallergic.com/153
681/an-illustrated-guide-to-artist-resale-royalties-aka-droit-de-suite/.
10 See LILIANE DE PIERREDON-FAWCETT, THE DROIT DE SUITE IN LITERARY AND ARTISTIC
PROPERTY 3 (Louise-Martin Valiquette trans. 1991, Ctr. for Law and the Arts Colum. Univ. Sch.
of Law) (citing Albert Vaunois, Chronique de Paris, February 25, 1893).
11 See id. at 2.
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artists shivering in an unheated Paris garret, suggesting that they deserved some
form of support.12

Jean-Louis Forain, A l’Hotel de Ventes (1905)
In 1903, the Societe des Amis du Luxembourg (Society of Friends of the
Luxembourg), proposed a descendible resale royalty right of 1%–2% of the sale
price of an artwork for fifty years.13 In 1905, many French newspapers
published a drawing by Jean-Louis Forain titled A l’Hotel de Ventes (At the
Auction Office), which depicted a ragged artist and his daughter outside an art
auction, with the caption Un tableau de papa! (Your father’s painting!). And in
1909, after a public demonstration, artists formed two groups to advocate for
the adoption of a resale royalty right, the Commission permanente du droit d’auteur
12 Giacomo Puccini, La Bohème (1896). The libretto was written by Luigi Illica and Giuseppe
Giacosa, and was based on the 1851 novel Scènes de la vie de bohème by Henri Murger.
13 DE PIERREDON-FAWCETT, supra note 10, at 3.
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aux artistes (Permanent Committee on Authors’ Rights for Artists) and Le Droit
d’Auteur aux artistes (Authors’ Rights for Artists).14
A. THE CREATION OF THE RESALE ROYALTY RIGHT IN FRANCE

In 1914, the Chambre des députés (Chamber of Delegates) considered a bill
proposing a resale royalty right of 2% of the sale price of artworks sold at
auction. The bill was tabled during the war, but reconsidered in 1918.15 And
on March 20, 1920, France created the first resale royalty right, giving artists an
inalienable and descendible right to a percentage of the sale price of their
artworks sold at public auction for the duration of the copyright in the artwork,
“on the condition that these works, such as paintings, sculpture, or designs, are
original and represent a personal creation of the artist.”16
Initially, the French resale royalty right required personal registration, and
entitled artists to graduated royalty payments of: 1% of the sale price from
1,000 to 10,000 francs; 1.5% of the sale price from 10,000 to 20,000 francs; 2%
of the sale price from 20,000 to 50,000 francs; and 3% of the sale price over
50,000 francs.17 In 1921, France amended its resale royalty right to permit
registration by rights management organizations.18 In 1922, France reduced the
threshold for the application of the resale royalty right to a sale price of 50
francs.19 And in 1985, France adopted a flat resale royalty right to 3% of the
sale price of artworks sold for more than 100 francs “by public auction or
through a dealer.”20 The French resale royalty right also specifies how many
copies of an editioned work an artist may create. For example, it permits the
creation of eight copies of a sculpture during the artist’s lifetime, and an
additional eight copies after the artist’s death.21
Id. at 3–4.
Id. at 4.
16 Law of May 20, 1920, Imposing on Public Sales of Artworks A Right Inuring to the Benefit
of Artists, 1920 B.L.D. 236, 20 Duv. & Boc. 539, reprinted in DE PIERREDON-FAWCETT, supra note
10, at 218–20.
17 Id.
18 Ministerial Order of February 21, 1921, Relating to the Application of the Law of May 20,
1920, reprinted in DE PIERREDON-FAWCETT, supra note 10, at 221.
19 Law of October 27, 1922, Modifying the Provisions of the Law of May 20, 1920, reprinted in
DE PIERREDON-FAWCETT, supra note 10, at 221–22.
20 Lo: 57-298 du 1 Mars 1957 (as amended by Lo: 85-660 du 3 Juillet 1985) sur la propriété
littéraire et artistique [Law 57-298 of March 11, 1957 on literary and artistic property], CODE DE
LA PROPRIÉTÉ INTELLECTUELLE [I.P.C.] [INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY CODE], July 3, 1992. France’s
droit de suite statute, codified today in Article L122-8 of France’s Intellectual Property Code, grants
artists a flat 3% royalty for all “graphic and three-dimensional works” sold above a certain price.
Intellectual Property Code, Art. L122-8, http://perma.cc/38MU-W5N4.
21 Id.
14
15
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B. THE SPREAD OF THE RESALE ROYALTY RIGHT TO OTHER COUNTRIES

On June 25, 1921, Belgium created a resale royalty right similar to the French
resale royalty right.22 In 1926, Czechoslovakia created a resale royalty right that
gave artists a right to a percentage of the increase of the value of their artworks
sold at auction, rather than the entire sale price.23 Poland, Uruguay, and Italy also
created resale royalty rights similar to the Czechoslovakian resale royalty right.24
In 1948, the Berne Convention was revised to provide for an optional resale
royalty right:
Article 14bis
(1) The author, or after his death the persons or institutions
authorized by national legislation, shall, in respect of original
works of art and original manuscripts of authors and
composers, enjoy the inalienable right to an interest in any
sale of the work subsequent to the first disposal of the work
by the author.
(2) The protection provided by the preceding paragraph may be
claimed in a country of the Union only if legislation in the
country to which the author belongs so permits, and to the
degree permitted by the country where this protection is
claimed.
(3) The procedure for collection and the amounts shall be
matters for determination by national legislation.25

22 Belgian Law of June 25, 1921, Imposing in the Case of Works of Art Sold at Public Auction,
a Levy in Favor of the Artists of the Works Sold et seq., reprinted in DE PIERREDON-FAWCETT,
supra note 10, at 204–07.
23 As amended by the Law of December 22, 1953 the Czechoslovakian Law of November 24,
1926, cited in DE PIERREDON-FAWCETT, supra note 10, at 215–16.
24 Poland created a resale royalty right in 1935, but eliminated it in 1952. Law of March 22,
1935, abrogated by Law No. 234 on Copyright, July 10, 1952, reprinted in DE PIERREDONFAWCETT, supra note 10, at 248. Uruguay created a resale royalty right in 1937. Law Number
9739 Concerning Literary and Artistic Copyright of December 15–17, 1937, amended February
15–25, 1938, reprinted in DE PIERREDON-FAWCETT, supra note 10, at 256. And Italy created a
resale royalty right in 1941. Copyright Statute Law Number 633 of April 22, 1941 for the
Protection of Copyright and Other Rights Associated with the Exercise Thereof et seq., reprinted
in DE PIERREDON-FAWCETT, supra note 10, at 235–39.
25 Berne Convention for the Protection of Literary and Artistic Works, Brussels Act, June 26,
1948, Art. 14bis. In 1971, the optional resale royalty right provision was moved to Article 14ter.
Berne Convention for the Protection of Literary and Artistic Works, Paris Act, July 24, 1971, Art.
14ter.
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The Tunis Model Law on Copyright for Developing Countries of 1976 also
incorporated an optional resale royalty right:
[Section 4bis
(1) Notwithstanding any assignment of the original work, the
authors of graphic and three-dimensional works [and
manuscripts] shall have an inalienable right to share in the
proceeds of any sale of that work [or manuscript] by public
auction or through a dealer, whatever the methods used by
the latter to carry out the operation.
(2) The foregoing shall not apply to architectural works or
works of applied art.
(3) The conditions of the exercise of this right shall be
determined by regulations to be issued by the competent
authority.]26
In 2000, the European Union adopted a uniform droit de suite law, and
required member states to implement national legislation consistent with the
uniform law by 2006, with full harmonization by 2012.27 The uniform law
required member states to create a resale royalty right applying to all
commercial sales of artwork, with some flexibility relating to the threshold
price, method of collection, and rates. The maximum threshold price is €3,000,
and the base rates are: (a) 4% for the portion of the sale price up to €50,000; (b)
3% for the portion of the sale price from €50,000 to €200,000; (c) 1% for the
portion of the sale price from €200, 000 to €350,000; (d) 0.5% for the portion
of the sale price from €350,000 to €500,000; and (e) 0.25% for the portion of
the sale price exceeding €500,000, with a maximum resale royalty of €12,500.28
Today, almost eighty countries have created some form of resale royalty
right.29 But while many countries have created a resale royalty right, not all have

26 TUNIS MODEL LAW ON COPYRIGHT FOR DEVELOPING COUNTRIES, supra note 6, Section 4bis
(1976).
27 Council Directive 2001/84/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 27
September 2001 on the Resale Right for the Benefit of the Author of an Original Work of Art,
recital 3, 2001 O.J. (L 272) 32–36, http://www.wipo.int/wipolex/en/text.jsp?file_id=180301; see also
Resale Royalties: An Updated Analysis, U.S. COPYRIGHT OFFICE (Dec. 2013), http://www.copyright.
gov/does/resaleroyalty/USCO-resaleroyalty.pdf [hereinafter Resale Royalties: An Undated Analysis].
28 Council Directive 2001/84/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 27
September 2001 on the Resale Right for the Benefit of the Author of an Original Work of Art,
recital 3, 2001 O.J. (L 272) 32–36, http://www.wipo.int/wipolex/en/text.jsp?file_id=180301; see
also U.S. COPYRIGHT OFFICE, supra note 27, at 13.
29 Resale Royalties: An Updated Analysis, supra note 27, at 17.
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functional resale royalty systems.30 Some countries have created a nominal
resale royalty right, but have not enabled enforcement.31 As Maitland observed,
“where there is no remedy there is no wrong.”32 Some countries have created a
resale royalty right that entitles artists to a percentage of the increase in value of
their artworks.33 While this is consistent with the premise of the resale royalty
right, it is difficult if not impossible for artists to determine the increase in value
of particular artworks, especially given the secrecy of the art market and the
ability of buyers to engage in creative accounting. Also, some countries have
created a resale royalty right that requires artists to collect resale royalties
themselves.34 While some artists may have the resources to collect their own
resale royalties, most do not.
In practice, functional resale royalty right systems typically give artists the
right to collect a percentage of the resale price of their artworks and authorize
the creation of resale royalty rights organizations to collect resale royalties.35
For example, the French resale royalty system relies on two resale royalty right
organizations, the Societe de la Propriete Artistique et des Dessins et Models
and the Association pour la Diffusion des Arts Graphiques et Plastiques.36
French artists can join one of these organizations and assign it their right to
collect resale royalties.37
III. THE RESALE ROYALTY RIGHT IN THE UNITED STATES
While the United States has not created a federal resale royalty right,
Congress has considered creating one many times, and the Copyright Office has
published two conflicting reports addressing resale royalty rights.
Surprisingly, the first effort to create a resale royalty right in the United
States was entirely private. In 1971, the artist, curator, and gallerist Seth
Siegelaub and the lawyer Robert Projansky collaborated on the creation of The
30 U.S. COPYRIGHT OFFICE, DROIT DE SUITE: THE ARTIST’S RESALE ROYALTY 49, https://
www.copyright.gov/history/droit-de-suite.pdf [hereinafter DROIT DE SUITE: THE ARTIST’S
RESALE ROYALTY] (“Although a number of countries claim to have droit de suite, examination of
their legal systems reveals that for many the principle is never carried out.” (internal citation
omitted)); see also LILIANE DE PIERREDON-FAWCETT ET AL., supra note 10.
31 Anna J. Mitran, Royalties Too?: Exploring Resale Royalties for New Media Art, 101 CORNELL L.
REV. 1349, 1370 (2016) (stating “[t]he California Act is often criticized for poor enforcement, and
even France . . . cannot always collect royalties from non-auction sales”).
32 F.W. Maitland, The Forms of Action at Common Law, Lecture I (1909), http://sourcebooks.ford
ham.edu/basis/maitland-formsofaction.asp.
33 Mitran, supra note 31, at 1356.
34 DE PIERREDON-FAWCETT, supra note 10, at 122–23.
35 Mitran, supra note 31, at 1356–59.
36 Maitland, supra note 32.
37 DROIT DE SUITE: THE ARTIST’S RESALE ROYALTY, supra note 30.
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Artist’s Reserved Rights Transfer and Sale Agreement, a document that became
known as the “Projansky Contract.”38 The Projansky Contract was an attempt
to create a de facto resale royalty right by contract.39 It consisted of a form
agreement for artists to use when selling artwork for the first time. The form
agreement provided, inter alia, that the buyer of the artwork agreed to pay the
artist 15% of the appreciated value of the artwork in the event of any future
transfer, and that the agreement would bind any future transferees for the life of
the artist plus twenty-one years.40
But the enforceability of the Projansky Contract was always dubious. For one
thing, the common law disfavors equitable servitudes on chattels.41 Typically, a
seller of personal property cannot restrict its subsequent use or transfer.42 While
the seller of an artwork could create an enforceable contractual right to a
percentage of the resale price of the artwork, the seller cannot create a contractual
right that will bind future buyers, without securitizing the artwork. Of course,
copyright does impose certain restrictions on the use of personal property that
incorporates a copyrighted work of authorship.43 But the Projansky Contract
conflicts with the first sale doctrine, which provides that the sale of a particular
copy of a copyrighted work of authorship exhausts the copyright owner’s
distribution right in that copy.44 If the first sale doctrine applies, it should
preempt any contractual restriction on alienation.

38 The Artist’s Reserved Rights Transfer And Sale Agreement (1971), http://primaryinformati
on.org/files/english.pdf [hereinafter Projansky Contract].
39 The Artist Reserved Rights Transfer and Sale Agreement, PRIMARY INFORMATION, http://www.pri
maryinformation.org/files/english.pdf (last visited Mar. 30, 2017).
40 Id.
41 See Zechariah Chafee, Jr., Equitable Servitudes on Chattels, 41 HARV. L. REV. 945, 955, 977
(1928) (observing that “the doctrine of equitable servitudes on chattels has been effectually killed
by the courts,” but asking whether some equitable servitudes should be enforceable). But see Glen
O. Robinson, Personal Property Servitudes, 71 U. CHI. L. REV. 1449, 1452 (2004) (observing that
“personal property servitudes, while exceptional, do still appear in the law and can serve
legitimate purposes in commercial transactions”).
42 See Chafee, supra note 41, at 948–50.
43 See, e.g., Shyamkrishna Balganesh, Copyright and Good Faith Purchasers, 104 CAL. L. REV. 269
(2016).
44 17 U.S.C. § 109(a) (2012) (providing that “the owner of a particular copy or phonorecord
lawfully made under this title, or any person authorized by such owner, is entitled, without the
authority of the copyright owner, to sell or otherwise dispose of the possession of that copy or
phonorecord”). At the time the Projansky Contract was drafted, the first sale doctrine was codified
in the Copyright Act of 1909 § 41, which provided, “[N]othing in this Act shall be deemed to forbid,
prevent, or restrict the transfer of any copy of a copyrighted work the possession of which has been
lawfully obtained.” Pub. L. No. 60-349, 35 Stat. 1075, 1084 (1909). See generally Aaron Perzanowski
& Jason Schultz, Reconciling Intellectual and Personal Property, 90 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1211 (2015)
(examining the history and policy goals of copyright exhaustion).
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.
Seth Siegelaub & Robert Projansky, The Artist’s Reserved Rights Transfer and
Sale Agreement [“Projansky Contract”] (1971)
Of course, courts have limited the application of the first sale doctrine by
allowing copyright owners to characterize transactions as “licenses” rather than
“sales.”45 However, courts have recognized limitations on the first sale doctrine
almost exclusively in relation to transactions involving digital property, and have
rejected efforts to restrict the transfer of physical property.46 Artwork is
typically physical property.47 Moreover, the Projansky Contract itself explicitly
refers to the contemplated transfer of the artwork as a “sale.” It is highly
unlikely that courts would find the Projansky Contract enforceable as written.
45 Irina D. Manta & David S. Olson, Hello Barbie: First They Will Monitor You, Then They Will
Discriminate Against You. Perfectly., 67 ALA. L. REV. 135 (2015) (“While the doctrine still holds today
in both patent and copyright, the courts have eroded the doctrine and begun to permit
downstream control of goods, especially when the purchaser has notice of the restrictions.”).
46 Compare MAI Sys. Corp. v. Peak Computer, Inc., 991 F.2d 511 (9th Cir. 1993) (enforcing
restrictions on the use of software), with Kirtsaeng v. John Wiley & Sons, Inc., 133 S. Ct. 1351
(2013) (invalidating restrictions on the transfer of books).
47 Visual Artwork and Copyright Protection, SPRINGBOARD FOR THE ARTS, http://springboardforthea
rts.org/wp-content/uploads/2014/06/visual-art-and-copyright.pdf (last visited Feb. 26, 2017).
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In any case, the Projansky Contract was intended more as a statement of
principle than as a means of actually creating an effective resale royalty right.
As Projansky observed, “We never expected this to become the standard of the
art world, but we wanted to raise the subject and maybe influence some
legislation.”48 Few artists ever tried to use the Projansky Contract, and even
fewer successfully convinced buyers to accept it. Ironically, only artists whose
artworks were already in considerable demand could insist that buyers accept
the Projansky Contract, and the few who did were more concerned about
making a statement of principle than economic gain. Interestingly, Daniel
Buren used the Projansky Contract without the resale royalty provision, purely
in order to keep track of his artworks.49 By the late 1970s, the Projansky
Contract was largely forgotten. Its enforceability was never tested, although it
did complicate the 1987 auction of Hans Haacke’s artwork On Social Grease
(1975), when the artist insisted the auctioneer display and read the Projansky
Contract aloud to the audience before the sale.50
A. FEDERAL RESALE ROYALTY RIGHTS

The United States Congress first considered a bill to create a federal resale
royalty right in 1978, in response to a campaign led by Rauschenberg, among
others. The Visual Artists’ Residual Rights Act of 1978 would have given artists
a resale royalty right to 5% of the sale price of their artwork sold for $1,000 or
more.51 The bill also would have created a National Commission on the Visual
Arts, and required registration with the Commission in order to collect a resale
royalty.52 The resale royalty right would not have applied to works sold by the
artist or to works sold at a loss, and would have lasted for the life of the artist
plus fifty years.53

48 Roberta Smith, When Artists Seek Royalties on Their Resales, N.Y. TIMES (May 31, 1987), http://
www.nytimes.com/1987/05/31/arts/when-artists-seek-royalties-on-their-resales.html?pagewant
ed=all.
49 MARIA EICHORN, THE ARTIST’S CONTRACT: INTERVIEWS WITH CARL ANDIE, DANIEL
BARREN, PAULA COOPER, HANS HAACKE, JENNY HOLZEN, ADRIAN PIPER, ROBERT PROJANSKY,
ROBERT RYMAN, SETH SIEGELAUB, JOHN WEBER, LAWRENCE WEINER, JACKIE WINSOR (Geiti
Fietzek ed., 2009).
50 See also Kibun Kim, Could a Long-Forgotten Contract Settle the Artist Resale Royalties Debate?,
HYPERALLERGIC, Jan. 5, 2015, http://hyperallergic.com/172688/could-a-long-forgotten-contrac
t-settle-the-resale-royalties-debate/ (unwittingly invoking Betteridge’s Law); ESSEX STREET, The
Contract, http://www.essexstreet.biz/exhibition/67 (last visited Mar. 29, 2017) (documenting
exhibition of artworks sold subject to the Projansky Contract).
51 Visual Artists’ Residual Rights Act of 1978, H.R. 11403, 95th Cong. § 4(a)(1) (1978).
52 Id. §§ 3(a), 4(d), 5(c), 6(a).
53 Id. § 4(e).
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In 1986, Congress considered the Visual Artists Rights Amendment of 1986.
The amendment would have amended the Copyright Act to give certain moral
rights to visual artists, including a resale royalty right to 7% of the difference
between the purchase and sale price of an artwork, if the sale price was more
than $500 and at least 140% of the purchase price.54 The right would have
lasted for the life of the artist plus fifty years, but after the artist’s death royalties
would have been paid to the National Endowment for the Arts.55 In 1987,
Congress considered the Visual Artists Rights Act of 1987, a similar bill that
would have created a resale royalty right to 7% of the difference between the
purchase and sale price of an artwork, if the sale price was more than $1,000
and at least 150% of the purchase price paid by the seller.56
On December 1, 1990, President Bush signed into law the Visual Artists
Rights Act of 1990 (VARA), which gave authors of “works of visual art” certain
waivable rights of attribution and integrity, but did not include a resale royalty
right. Instead, it directed the Copyright Office to conduct a study of resale
royalty rights in consultation with the National Endowment for the Arts.
Following the study, in 1992, the Copyright Office released a report opposing
the creation of resale royalty rights, primarily on economic grounds.57
However, the push to create a resale royalty right eventually resumed. In
2011, Congress considered a bill titled the Equity for Visual Artists Act of 2011,
which would have given visual artists a resale royalty right to 7% of the sale
price of artworks sold for more than $10,000.58 Although the bill failed, it
prompted Congress to ask the Copyright Office to produce another report on
resale royalties.
In 2013, the Copyright Office released a revised report on resale royalties,
which recommended the creation of a federal resale royalty right.59 Specifically,
it recommended the creation of a resale royalty right of 3%–5% of an artwork’s
resale price lasting for the life of the artist, applied to all commercial sales of
artwork registered for copyright protection, with a threshold value of $1,000–
$5,000 and a maximum resale royalty per sale.60 It also recommended the
creation of resale royalty organizations to collect and distribute resale royalties.
The Copyright Office based its recommendation primarily on its conclusion
that copyright disadvantages artists because it typically does not enable them to
Visual Artists Rights Amendment of 1986, S. 2796, 99th Cong. (1986).
Id.
56 Visual Artists Rights Act of 1988, S. 1619, 100th Cong. (1988); Visual Artists Rights Act of
1987, H.R. 3221, 100th Cong. (1987).
57 DROIT DE SUITE: THE ARTIST’S RESALE ROYALTY, supra note 30.
58 Equity for Visual Artists Act of 2011, S. 2000, 112th Cong. (2011).
59 Resale Royalties: An Updated Analysis, supra note 27.
60 Id.
54
55
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benefit from the economic success of their artworks.61 It also concluded that
the creation of a resale royalty right could provide an additional incentive to
create and distribute artworks, and probably would not adversely affect the
United States art market.62 But it recommended caution, observing that
creating a resale royalty right would benefit very few artists, and could impose
significant administrative costs.63
In response to the 2013 study, Congress considered a bill titled the
American Royalties Too Act of 2014, known by its predictable “backronym”
the “ART Act.”64 The bill would have given artists a resale royalty right to the
lesser of 5% of the sale price or $35,000 of artworks sold at auction for $5,000
or more.65 The right would have been inalienable, except in the case of works
made for hire or copyright transfer. Royalties would have been payable to
rights management organizations regulated by the Copyright Office, and the
failure to pay royalties would have been a form of copyright infringement.66
B. STATE RESALE ROYALTY RIGHTS

Many states have also considered creating a resale royalty right, but only
California actually created one. In 1976, California enacted the California
Resale Royalties Act (CRRA).67 It gave artists an inalienable resale royalty right
to 5% of the sale price or an artwork sold for more than $1,000 in California or
by a California resident, if the artwork had increased in value.68 The right
applied to “fine art,” defined as original paintings, sculptures, drawings, and
glass works, lasted for the life of the artist plus twenty years, and was nonwaivable, unless a written contract provided a royalty larger than 5%.69 The
royalty was payable to the artist or the artist’s heirs, unless they could not be
located, in which case it was payable to the California Arts Council, for the
eventual benefit of the City of Sacramento’s Art in Public Places Program.70

Id.
Id.
63 Id.
64 American Royalties Too Act of 2014, S. 2045, 113th Cong. (2014).
65 Id.
66 Id.
67 California Resale Royalties Act, CAL. CIV. CODE 986 (1976).
68 Id.
69 Id.
70 See DROIT DE SUITE: THE ARTIST’S RESALE ROYALTY, supra note 30, at 68. The provision
making unclaimed funds payable to the California Arts Council was eventually removed. See
generally California Resale Royalty Act, CAL. ARTS COUNCIL, http://www.cac.ca.gov/resources/rra.
php (last visited Mar. 29, 2017).
61
62
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In 1978, art dealers challenged the constitutionality of the CRRA, arguing that
it was preempted by the first sale doctrine, among other things.71 But in 1980, the
Ninth Circuit rejected their claim. It held that the CRRA was not preempted by
the first sale doctrine of the Copyright Act of 1909 because it regulated a matter
not covered by that Act. And it held that the Copyright Act of 1976 did not
apply because the sales in question occurred before it went into effect.72 The
Supreme Court denied certiorari, and the art dealers declined to pursue further
action, leaving the validity of the CRRA under the 1976 Act in limbo.73
In 2011, a group of artists filed a class action against Sotheby’s and
Christie’s, alleging that they had violated the CRRA by selling at auction artwork
owned by California residents and not paying any royalty.74 Initially, the district
court held that the CRRA was unconstitutional because it violated the
Commerce Clause.75 In 2015, the Ninth Circuit reversed in part, holding that
extraterritorial application of the CRRA was preempted by the dormant
Commerce Clause, but application in California was not.76 But in 2016, the
district court held that the CRRA was preempted by both the first sale doctrine
and the preemption provision of the Copyright Act.77 While the plaintiffs have
appealed, they are unlikely to prevail.78 If a statutory resale royalty right is going
to exist in the United States, it will almost certainly have to be a federal resale
royalty right created by Congress, unless Congress amends the Copyright Act to
allow states to create a resale royalty right.
C. THE CONSTITUTIONALITY OF A FEDERAL RESALE ROYALTY RIGHT

If Congress creates a federal resale royalty right, it may not apply to all
artworks. Presumably, any resale royalty right would be created by amending
the Copyright Act, much as the Visual Artists Rights Act of 1990 amended the
Copyright Act to extend attribution and integrity rights to the authors of
“works of visual art.”79 The Copyright Act specifically provides, “[a] work of
Morseburg v. Balyon, 1978 U.S. Dist. Lexis 18831, 1978 WL 980 (C.D. Cal. Mar. 23, 1978),
aff’d, 621 F.2d 972 (9th Cir. 1980).
72 Morseburg v. Balyon, 621 F.2d 972, 975, 977 (9th Cir. 1980).
73 Morseburg v. Balyon, 101 S. Ct. 399 (1980).
74 Estate of Graham v. Sotheby’s Inc., 860 F. Supp. 2d 1117, 1119 (C.D. Cal. 2012).
75 Id. at 1126.
76 Sam Francis Foundation v. Christies, Inc., 784 F.3d 1320, 1322 (9th Cir. 2015).
77 Estate of Graham v. Sotheby’s, Inc., 178 F. Supp. 3d 974, 988 (C.D. Cal. 2016) (citing 17
U.S.C. § 109(a) (2012) (first sale doctrine); 17 U.S.C. § 301(a) (2012) (preemption provision)).
78 See generally David E. Shipley, Droit de Suite, Copyright’s First Sale Doctrine and Preemption of
State Law, 39 HASTINGS COMMS. & ENT. L.J. 1 (2017) (concluding that the district court opinion is
correct).
79 Visual Artists Rights Act (VARA), Pub. L. No. 101-650, tit. VI, 104 Stat. 5128 (1990)
(codified in part in 17 U.S.C. §§ 101, 106A, 107, 113, 301, 411, 412, 501) (2012).
71
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visual art does not include . . . any work not subject to copyright protection
under this title.”80 Under the Intellectual Property Clause, copyright can only
protect original works of authorship, and originality requires both independent
creation and some degree of creativity.81 The Copyright Act also specifically
provides that copyright cannot protect ideas, only particular expressions of
ideas.82 This “idea-expression” dichotomy prompted courts to create the
“merger doctrine,” which provides that copyright cannot protect an expression
of an idea that can only be expressed in one way or a limited number of ways,
because the idea “merges” with the expression.83
While the originality bar to copyright protection is vanishingly low, it
precludes copyright protection of at least some works of modern and
contemporary art. Marcel Duchamp’s notorious sculpture Fountain, which
consisted of a porcelain urinal signed, “R. Mutt 1917,” surely fails to qualify for
copyright protection, as Duchamp did not contribute any elements that satisfy the
originality requirement.84 Likewise, Yves Klein’s monochrome paintings, which
consist of canvases painted a uniform aquamarine color known as “International
Klein Blue,” surely fails the originality requirement for the same reason. The
copyrightability of many artworks under the merger doctrine is also unclear.
Many of Frank Stella’s paintings, which typically consist of simple geometrical
patterns, probably do not qualify for copyright protection, because they reflect an
“idea” that can only be expressed in one way or a limited number of ways.
Likewise, many of Agnes Martin’s paintings, which typically consist of handpainted or hand-drawn lines and grids, may not qualify for copyright protection.

17 U.S.C. § 101(2)(c) (2012).
Feist Publ’ns, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 499 U.S. 340, 345, 355 (1991).
82 17 U.S.C. § 102(b) (2012) (stating “[i]n no case does copyright protection for an original
work of authorship extend to any idea, procedure, process, system, method of operation, concept,
principle, or discovery, regardless of the form in which it is described, explained, illustrated, or
embodied in such work”).
83 See, e.g., Herbert Rosenthal Jewelry Corp. v. Kalpakian, 446 F.2d 738 (9th Cir. 1971);
Morrissey v. Procter & Gamble Co., 379 F.2d 675 (1st Cir. 1967).
84 But see Bleistein v. Donaldson Lithographing Co., 188 U.S. 239, 250 (1903) (stating
“[p]ersonality always contains something unique. It expresses its singularity even in handwriting,
and a very modest grade of art has in it something irreducible, which is one man’s alone. That
something he may copyright unless there is a restriction in the words of the act.”).
80
81
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Agnes Martin, [untitled], from the portfolio On a Clear Day (1973)
If an artwork cannot constitutionally be protected by copyright, it is unclear
whether Congress can constitutionally grant its creator a resale royalty right. At
the very least, it would be in tension with the constitutional subject matter of
copyright.
Of course, this tension is inevitable when Congress grants “moral rights” in
works of authorship. For example, the Visual Artists Rights Act of 1990
granted “moral rights” of attribution and integrity to the authors of certain
works of authorship defined as “works of visual art.”85 Copyright is typically
conceptualized as a form of property right because it is alienable. Copyright

Visual Artists’ Rights Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-650, Title VI, 104 Stat. 5128 (1990)
(codified at 17 U.S.C. §§ 101, 106A, 107, 113, 301, 411, 412, 501, 506 (2012)).
85
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owners may transfer their exclusive rights in whole or in part essentially at will.86
By contrast, the moral rights of attribution and integrity granted to the authors
of works of visual art by VARA are personal rights, not property rights, because
they are waivable but inalienable.87 Likewise, resale royalty rights are personal
rights, not property rights, because they are typically non-waivable and
inalienable.
Moreover, while copyright grants exclusive rights in an intangible work of
authorship that can be reproduced indefinitely, “moral rights” often grant
exclusive rights in particular copies of a work of authorship.88 A copyright
owner has the exclusive right to reproduce and distribute copies of a work of
authorship, but once a copy is sold, the first sale doctrine provides that the
copyright owner no longer has an exclusive right to distribute that particular
copy. By contrast, “moral rights” often must survive the sale of a particular
copy in order to be meaningful. The right of integrity is meaningful only if it
applies to particular copies of a work of authorship, which may be unique
objects. Likewise, the resale royalty right is meaningful only if it applies to
particular copies of a work of authorship, for the same reason.
Scholars have long recognized the tension between “moral rights” and the
property rights granted by copyright.89 Indeed, Congress itself tacitly
recognized that tension by making the “moral rights” granted by VARA
waivable, rather than non-waivable, as they are under the Berne Convention.90
In other words, Congress tried to make moral rights look more like property
rights, in order to reconcile them with copyright.
Nevertheless, Congress could amend the Copyright Act to create a federal
resale royalty right. In fact, it considered doing so when it enacted VARA.91
86 See 17 U.S.C. § 201(d) (2012) (stating “(1) The ownership of a copyright may be transferred
in whole or in part by any means of conveyance or by operation of law, and may be bequeathed
by will or pass as personal property by the applicable laws of intestate succession. (2) Any of the
exclusive rights comprised in a copyright, including any subdivision of any of the rights specified
by section 106, may be transferred as provided by clause (1) and owned separately. The owner of
any particular exclusive right is entitled, to the extent of that right, to all of the protection and
remedies accorded to the copyright owner by this title.”).
87 Cf. Jennifer E. Rothman, The Inalienable Right of Publicity, 101 GEO. L.J. 185, 209 (2012)
(discussing the relationship between alienability and property).
88 Cf. Amy Adler, Fair Use and the Future of Art, 91 N.Y.U. L. REV. 559 (2016) (arguing that
copyright is irrelevant to most artists, who sell unique objects, rather than reproductions of
copyrighted works of authorship).
89 See, e.g., Amy M. Adler, Against Moral Rights, 97 CAL. L. REV. 263 (2009).
90 See Visual Artists Rights Amendment of 1986, S. 2796, 99th Cong. (1986); Visual Artists Rights
Act of 1987, S. 1619, 100th Cong. (1987); H.R. 3221, 100th Cong. (1987) (precursors to VARA).
91 Visual Artists’ Rights Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-650, Title VI, 104 Stat. 5128 (1990)
(codified at 17 U.S.C. §§ 101, 106A, 107, 113, 301, 411, 412, 501, 506 (2012)). See also Berne
Convention, Article 6bis.
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And a federal resale royalty right would probably be constitutional, under either
the Commerce Clause or the Taxing and Spending Clause.92
IV. THE JUSTIFICATION OF THE RESALE ROYALTY RIGHT
Scholars are divided on the justification of the resale royalty right. Some
argue that it is justified, because it encourages artists to make artwork, prevents
unfair treatment of artists, and enables artists to equitably share in the value of
their work.93 Others argue that it is not justified, because it is unnecessary,
inequitable, and inefficient.94 But assessments of the justification of the resale
royalty right typically reflect underlying beliefs about the theoretical justification
of copyright.95
A. THEORIES OF COPYRIGHT

The prevailing theory of copyright under United States law is the economic
theory, which holds that copyright is justified because it solves market failures
in works of authorship, thereby increasing net economic welfare.96 Not only
does the Intellectual Property Clause of the Constitution imply an economic
U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 1 (Commerce Clause) & 3 (Taxing and Spending Clause).
However, a retroactive resale royalty right might be a “taking” under the Fifth Amendment,
because it would affect the property rights of an owner of a particular copy of a work of
authorship. Cf. Gregory Dolin & Irina D. Manta, Taking Patents, 73 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 719
(2016) (arguing that the Takings Clause should apply to regulatory takings of patents); Davida
Isaacs, Not All Property is Created Equal: Why Modern Courts Resist Applying the Takings Clause to
Patents, and Why They are Right to Do So, 15 GEO. MASON L. REV. 1 (2007) (arguing that the Takings
Clause should not apply to regulatory takings of patent rights). This could be a problem for
proposals like the “ART Act,” which contemplates retroactive resale royalties. See also American
Royalties Too Act of 2014, S. 2045, 113th Cong. (2014).
93 See, e.g., DE PIERREDON-FAWCETT, supra note 10, at 122–23; Michael B. Reddy, The Droit de
Suite: Why American Fine Artists Should Have the Right to a Resale Royalty, 15 LOY. L.A. ENT. L. REV.
509 (1995).
94 See, e.g., Elliott C. Alderman, Resale Royalties in the United States for Fine Visual Artists: An Alien
Concept, 40 J. COPYRIGHT SOC’Y U.S.A. 265, 267 (1993) (“[T]he proponents of the resale right
have not demonstrated empirically that the Copyright Act, in fact, treats fine artists less favorably
than authors and composers who create numerous copies of their works. Nor have they shown
that the creation of a resale royalty would promote the broad availability of works and stimulate
artistic creation.”); Alexander Bussey, The Incompatibility of Droit de Suite with Common Law Theories of
Copyright, 23 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. 1063 (2013); Guy A. Rub, The
Unconvincing Case for Resale Royalties, 124 YALE L.J. FORUM 1 (2014).
95 See generally ROBERT P. MERGES, JUSTIFYING INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY (2011) (discussing
relationship between intellectual property theory and policy).
96 See, e.g., RONALD A. CASS & KEITH N. HYLTON, LAWS OF CREATION: PROPERTY RIGHTS IN
THE WORLD OF IDEAS 97–125 (2013); William M. Landes & Richard A. Posner, An Economic
Analysis of Copyright Law, 18 J. LEG. STUD. 325 (1989).
92
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theory of copyright, but also Congress and the Supreme Court have repeatedly
and uniformly adopted an economic theory of copyright.97 And the economic
theory of copyright is also the prevailing theory among copyright scholars.98
Classical economics predicts that free riding will cause market failures in
public goods.99 Works of authorship are public goods, because they are purely
non-rival and non-excludable. Consumption of a work of authorship cannot
diminish the supply of the work, and in the absence of copyright, the author of
a published work cannot prevent anyone from consuming it. Accordingly, in
the absence of copyright, classical economics predicts market failures in works
of authorship. Rational economic actors underinvest in the production of new
works of authorship, because consumers will free ride, rather than pay the
marginal cost of production. In theory, copyright can solve market failures in
works of authorship by making them partially excludable, thereby enabling
authors to force consumers to pay the marginal cost of production.100
The economic theory is explicitly consequentialist. Under the economic
theory, copyright is justified because it increases net economic welfare by
solving market failures in works of authorship.101 By extension, copyright is
justified only if and when it increases net economic welfare, and is not justified
if and when it decreases net economic welfare.
Of course, there are alternative natural right and moral right theories of
copyright.102 The natural right theory holds that copyright is justified because

97 See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8 (granting Congress the power “To promote the progress of
science and useful arts, by securing for limited times to authors and inventors the exclusive right
to their respective writings and discoveries”); H.R. REP. NO. 2222, 60th Cong., 2d Sess., 6–7
(1909) (stating that copyright was designed “primarily for the benefit of the public,” for “the
benefit of the great body of people, in that it will stimulate writing and invention”); see also H.R.
REP. NO. 105-452, p. 4 (1998) (term extension “provide[s] copyright owners generally with the
incentive to restore older works and further disseminate them to the public”); see also Eldred v.
Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186 (2003) (quoting Mazer v. Stein, 347 U.S. 201, 219 (1954)) (“The economic
philosophy behind the clause empowering Congress to grant patents and copyrights is the
conviction that encouragement of individual effort by personal gain is the best way to advance
public welfare through the talents of authors and inventors in ‘Science and useful Arts.’ ”).
98 MERGES, supra note 95, at 2 (“Current convention has it that IP law seeks to maximize the
net social benefit of the practices it regulates.”).
99 Free riding is the consumption of a good without paying the marginal cost of production;
market failures are inefficiencies in the market for a good; and public goods are goods that are
non-rival and non-excludable.
100 See, e.g., CASS & HYLTON, supra note 96, at 97–125; Landes & Posner, supra note 96, at 325.
101 See, e.g., Landes & Posner, supra note 96, at 325; CASS & HYLTON, supra note 96, at 97–125.
102 See generally Peter S. Menell, Intellectual Property: General Theories, in 2 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF LAW &
ECONOMICS 129 (Boudewijn Bouckaert & Gerrit de Geest, eds., 2000) (outlining the labor and
personhood theories, among others); MERGES, supra note 95, at 3 (providing a more detailed
account of the Lockean and Kantian theories of intellectual property); Jane C. Ginsburg, A Tale of
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authors have a natural right to enjoy the fruits of their labor.103 And the various
moral right theories hold that copyright is justified because authors have a
moral right to control the use of the works of authorship they create, and share
in the profits generated by those works.104
Adherents to consequentialist theories of copyright—including the
economic theory—typically consider the justifications offered by moral theories
as little more than question-begging ipse dixit.105 The moral theories hold that
copyright is justified because authors are entitled to certain rights in their works
of authorship. Consequentialist theories of copyright ask why authors are
entitled to those rights. Specifically, they ask why authors should be entitled to
those rights if they are inefficient and decrease net social welfare. For
consequentialists, copyright is a means to an end. For moral rights theorists, it
is an end in itself.
The resale royalty right, like the “moral rights” of attribution and integrity
granted by VARA, is essentially a form of para-copyright that grants authors
certain rights in particular copies of their works of authorship, rather than the
underlying work itself. If the resale royalty right is a form of copyright,
presumably its justification ought to be evaluated on the same terms as other
forms of copyright. In other words, if one accepts the economic theory of
copyright, then the resale royalty right is justified only if and when it increases
net economic welfare. By contrast, if one accepts a moral rights theory of
copyright, then the resale royalty right is justified only if it advances some
deontological value.
Proponents of the resale royalty right typically argue that it is justified under
both the economic and moral rights theories, because it increases both
economic efficiency and equity.106 They claim it increases economic efficiency
by providing an incentive for artists to create artworks. And they claim it
increases equity because artists have an equitable right to claim a percentage of
the resale price of the artworks they created. But are they correct? And if they
are not, is it possible to create a resale royalty system that is justified under both
theories?

Two Copyrights: Literary Property in Revolutionary France and America, 64 TUL. L. REV. 991 (1990)
(exploring the different justifications for copyright law under French and United States law).
103 Mennell, supra note 102; MERGES, supra note 95, Ginsburg, supra note 102.
104 Mennell, supra note 102.
105 See, e.g., Mark A. Lemley, Faith-Based Intellectual Property, 62 UCLA L. REV. 1328 (2015).
106 See, e.g., Thomas M. Goetzl, In Support of the Resale Royalty, 7 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 249
(1989); Alma Robinson, Resale Royalties for Visual Artists: Promoting Equity and Expression, 6 CYBARIS
INTELL. PROP. L. REV. 96 (2015); see also DROIT DE SUITE: THE ARTIST’S RESALE ROYALTY, supra
note 30, at 31–40.
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B. THE RESALE ROYALTY RIGHT UNDER THE ECONOMIC THEORY OF
COPYRIGHT

The resale royalty right as traditionally formulated is difficult to justify under
the economic theory of copyright. Under the economic theory, copyright is
justified because it solves market failures in works of authorship by providing
salient incentives for marginal authors to invest in the production of works of
authorship. Accordingly, the resale royalty right is justified only if it provides
salient incentives for marginal artists to invest in the production of artworks.
But it probably does not.
First, the economic case for copyright protection of art is weak, because
copyright does not provide salient incentives to most artists. As Amy Adler has
observed, copyright is largely irrelevant to visual artists.107 Not only is copying
“essential to contemporary art,” but also, copyright protection has no economic
value to most artists.108
Copyright assumes that authors create an original work of authorship and
sell copies of that work to consumers. Copyright law provides salient incentives
to authors by giving them certain exclusive rights to reproduce, distribute,
perform, display, and adapt the works of authorship they create. These rights
enable them to prevent free riding and internalize some of the positive
externalities they generate.109
But most artists do not sell reproductions of their artworks: they sell the
originals. Intangible works of authorship are public goods, but tangible
artworks are not. Copyright assumes abundance, but the art market depends on
scarcity. Copyright assumes reproduction, but the art market depends on the
“aura” of the unique artwork.110 Copyright assumes that it gives authors
valuable exclusive rights, but the art market largely ignores copyright, except to
flout it. If anything, most artists have an incentive not to exercise the exclusive
rights of copyright owners, because uncontrolled reproduction, distribution,
and display of the intangible works of authorship they create typically increases
the value of the unique artworks they actually sell.
Some advocates of the resale royalty right argue that it is justified because
copyright disadvantages artists by providing exclusive rights that are valuable to
many authors—but not to artists.111 The exclusive rights of copyright owners

See generally Adler, supra note 88, at 559.
Id. at 567, 573 n.50.
109 See generally Brett M. Frischman & Mark A. Lemley, Spillovers, 107 COLUM. L. REV. 257, 282
(2007).
110 Cf. WALTER BENJAMIN, THE WORK OF ART IN THE AGE OF MECHANICAL REPRODUCTION
(1936).
111 See, e.g., Resale Royalties: An Updated Analysis, supra note 27, at 31.
107
108
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are valuable to authors who create works of authorship typically sold as
reproductions, but not to artists who create works of authorship typically sold
as unique object. The resale royalty right simply gives artists a right that is
actually valuable to them.
But there is no reason to give authors an additional right simply because
they choose to participate in a market in which the other rights they receive are
not valuable. Artists can and do sell reproductions as well as originals. Indeed,
the most popular artists can generate significant income by licensing the
reproduction of their artworks, and many commercial artists generate income
primarily by selling reproductions rather than originals.
Moreover, unlike many authors who effectively must transfer copyright
ownership of their works of authorship in order to profit from those works,
artists typically retain the copyright in their works of authorship, even after they
have sold the original. Musicians, screenwriters, commercial artists, and so on
are typically expected to transfer copyright ownership in their works to a
publisher or distributor in exchange for an advance and a percentage of the
profits. However, more often than not, the works are unprofitable, and the
author never receives anything but the advance. By contrast, artists typically
retain the copyright in their works of authorship, and in the event the copyright
becomes valuable, they are in a position to exploit it.
Some advocates of the resale royalty right also argue that it is justified
because it provides an economic incentive to artists.112 On its face, this
argument is implausible, because the resale royalty right is vanishingly unlikely
to provide salient incentives to marginal artists. The economic theory of
copyright assumes that authors are rational economic actors who make
decisions on the basis of risk-adjusted returns on investment. Copyright
provides an incentive to marginal authors by reducing the risk of free riding and
increasing the return on successful investments, thereby providing salient
incentives to at least some marginal authors. Rational authors would not create
easily copied or expensive to produce works of authorship in the absence of
copyright. Copyright surely provides salient incentives to at least some marginal
authors, especially those who produce commercial works of authorship with
reasonably predictable, well-developed, and liquid consumer markets. No one
would invest in the production of commercial films costing hundreds of
millions of dollars without copyright protection.
By contrast, the resale royalty right is highly unlikely to provide salient
incentives to economically rational marginal artists. Few artists sell any
112 See, e.g., Robinson, supra note 106, at 98 (“The resale royalty, or ‘droit de suite,’ provides the
visual artist with an economic incentive to continue to work in a demanding and often financially
challenging as well as lonely, profession.”).
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artworks at all, and even fewer artists sell artworks that increase in value. Less
than 1% of living artists have a resale market for their artworks.113 In theory,
the resale royalty right cannot provide salient incentives to marginal artists who
have not yet established a market for their artworks, because it is vanishingly
unlikely that it ever provides meaningful returns. Neither can the resale royalty
right provide salient incentives to marginal artists who have established a
market for their artworks, because they can easily price risk-adjusted returns
into the initial sale price.
Of course, people typically are not rational economic actors, and artists are
no exception. Indeed, if anything, artists are especially irrational.114 Given the
risk-adjusted rate of return, it is irrational to become an artist. Just as copyright
is hypersalient to some authors, the resale royalty right may be hypersalient to
some artists.115 For example, one supporter of the resale royalty right reports,
“In a 2012 survey of [California Lawyers for the Arts] members, 84% of the
respondents said that California resale royalty is an important incentive for
them to continue their work, even though most have not received such
payments.”116 Either the respondents didn’t understand the question, or they
are economically irrational.
113 RUTH TOWSE, HANDBOOK OF CULTURAL ECONOMICS 38 (2003) (“In most Western
European countries and the USA, only a small percentage of contemporary artists can make a
living from selling their work on the market. Works made by an even smaller percentage of living
artists are traded on the secondary market.”); see DROIT DE SUITE: THE ARTIST’S RESALE
ROYALTY, supra note 30, at 103–04 & n.30 (citing surveys finding that from 1972–1977, about 150
out of 200,000 living artists had a resale market, in 1980 about 300 out of 200,000 living artists
had a resale market, and in 1990, only 219 living artists met the $10,000 threshold for resale
royalties, based on auction at Christie’s and Sotheby’s); see also Resale Royalties: An Updated Analysis,
supra note 27, at 42 n.283 (“A 1999 study found that ‘of the 233,000 U.S. citizens who classified
themselves as “painters, sculptors, craft-artists, and artist printmakers,” 357 (0.15 percent) have
an art resale market of greater than $1,000 over the last fifty-one-month period.’ ”).
114 See JESSICA SILBEY, THE EUREKA MYTH: CREATORS, INNOVATORS, AND EVERYDAY
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY (2014) (finding that artists self-report as not responding to economic
incentives to create artworks).
115 See Resale Royalties: An Updated Analysis, supra note 27, at 39 & n.263 (2013) (“The idea that a
resale royalty encourages creativity does find some support in social psychology literature,
specifically the concept of ‘optimism bias,’ which refers to an individual’s irrational or unrealistic
optimism that his or her work will be successful or otherwise highly valued.” (citing Christopher
Buccafusco & Christopher Jon Sprigman, The Creativity Effect, 78 U. CHI. L. REV. 31, 51 (2011)
(“Creators are likely to overvalue works that they were internally motivated to create and that
required substantial creative effort compared with both potential purchasers and mere owners of
the works. Our data suggest this valuation anomaly is driven primarily by creators’ irrational
optimism about their works’ likelihoods of success.”)). “Professor Sprigman in particular is
skeptical of the resale royalty, but, if artists believe, however irrationally or unrealistically, that
their works are likely to be successful on the secondary market, then the optimism bias —
embodied as a resale royalty — might incentivize greater creativity.”).
116 Robinson, supra note 106, at 99.
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However, we should be skeptical of survey results. While a survey may
provide an accurate assessment of people’s normative beliefs, it does not
necessarily provide an accurate assessment of how they actually respond to
incentives. There is no evidence that the adoption of the CRRA increased the
production of artworks in California, or that its invalidation reduced the
production of artworks. Moreover, the epicenter of the art world—New
York—does not have a resale royalty right. Notably, while Paris and Berlin
remain important centers of the art world, their importance diminished after
they adopted a resale royalty right, suggesting that the resale royalty right could
actually decrease the production of artworks, presumably by reducing demand.
Moreover, it seems highly unlikely that the resale royalty right could actually
provide a salient incentive even to irrational economic actors. The probability
of any particular artist eventually becoming successful is very low, at best about
0.1%.117 As a consequence, the expected future value of an artwork created by
an artist who is not currently successful is effectively zero. To the extent that
marginal artists respond to economic incentives at all, they are necessarily
gambling on success. It is implausible that the right to a percentage of the
resale price of an artwork currently lacking any value could actually provide a
salient additional incentive to marginal artists, no matter what they might say
when asked.118 Experience suggests that the resale royalty right is valued highly
by successful artists, who are already in the money, but irrelevant to
unsuccessful artists, for whom it is little more than a pipe dream.
Supporters of the resale royalty right also argue that it is justified under the
economic theory because artists are often in a poor bargaining position when
they sell their artworks. But this argument is not compelling.119 For one thing,
artists are in a “poor bargaining position” only to the extent that the future
value of the artworks they create is highly uncertain. While a small number of
artworks increase in value over time, and a vanishingly small number become
immensely valuable, the overwhelming majority decrease in value, and many are
worth nothing or almost nothing.120
The resale royalty right enables artists to internalize the positive externalities
they generate by giving them a right to a percentage of the increase in the value
See DROIT DE SUITE: THE ARTIST’S RESALE ROYALTY, supra note 30, at 103–04 & n.30.
Cf. Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186 (2003) (Breyer, J., dissenting) (“No potential author can
reasonably believe that he has more than a tiny chance of writing a classic that will survive
commercially long enough for the copyright extension to matter. After all, if, after 55 to 75 years,
only 2% of all copyrights retain commercial value, the percentage surviving after 75 years or more
(a typical pre-extension copyright term)—must be far smaller.”).
119 See, e.g., Rub, supra note 94, at 1.
120 Gilbert S. Edelson, The Case Against an American Droit de Suite, 7 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J.
260, 263–64 (1989) (observing that “most art declines in value” and “less than one quarter of one
percent of all living artists have active resale markets for their work”).
117
118
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of their artworks, but does not require them to internalize any negative
externalities.121 As the painter Gerome observed in 1903:
One cannot neglect the other side of the coin: you pay a very
high price for one of those pieces of trash which are popular
nowadays and you sell it again for a mere song in a more or less
distant future. Will you ask the seller to share the loss? I already
know what his answer would be.122
The price a rational buyer is willing to pay is the expected future value of the
artwork, discounted by the risk that it will be worth less.123 The resale royalty
right provides that artists get a percentage of any increase in the value of the
artwork, effectively reducing its expected future value. As a consequence,
rational buyers will reduce the amount they are willing to spend on an artwork,
especially when its future expected value is uncertain. In other words, the resale
royalty right makes the bargaining position of as-yet-unsuccessful artists even
worse, because the expected future value of their artworks is highly uncertain.124
In a free-market . . . , the value of an object is what a willing
buyer will pay a willing seller at a given time. Thus, when a young
artist without a recognized market sells a work to a collector—
who assumes the considerable risk that the work may decline in
value—market forces dictate the price and terms of the exchange.
And consistent with free-market property rights, the collector
receives the interests he negotiated in the work as a quid pro quo
for his gamble.125
Critics of the resale royalty right also argue that the “starving artist” is a
myth. “Visual artists are neither poor nor in a weak bargaining position vis-à-

121

Id. at 261.

122 DE PIERREDON-FAWCETT, supra note 10, at 11.
123 Resale Royalties: An Updated Analysis, supra note

27, at 38 (observing that opponents claim “a
resale royalty will drive down demand for works and lower prices in the primary market because
buyers will offer less for an encumbered work than for one that could be purchased free and clear”).
124 See Ben W. Bolch, William W. Damon & C. Elton Hinshaw, An Economic Analysis of the
California Art Royalty Statute, 10 CONN. L. REV. 689, 693 (1978) (“Although both the artist and the
buyer agree on the future price of the work, they differ in their preferences for present
consumption relative to future consumption. In a noncoerced exchange, both parties benefit.
However, at some later time, because of increased wealth or for other reasons, the artist may have
a lesser need for present consumption and may in retrospect view the sale with regret, feeling that
a just price was not obtained at the time of original sale.”).
125 Alderman, supra note 94, at 270.
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vis their buyers, and the Copyright Act does not disfavor these artists in any
way.”126 As they observe, the market for artwork is robust and lucrative.
Barriers to entry are low and returns on investment are potentially substantial.
And “most studies conclude that artists’ lifetime earnings ‘very closely
approximate what they could achieve in non-artistic pursuits.”127
While these observations are true, they are also incomplete. By at least one
measure, the average income of an artist is similar to the average income of
other copyright owners.128 But median income seems like the more relevant
measure, given that a vanishingly small number of artists are wildly successful,
and a slightly larger number are modestly successful, but the overwhelming
majority are abject failures.129 Moreover, how should a study of the median
income of artists account for unsuccessful artists? If one includes both
successful (“primary job”) and unsuccessful (“secondary job”) artists in the
study, surely it would dramatically diminish the median income figure, at least
insofar as that income is derived from the sale of artworks. Critics of the resale
royalty right are correct that successful artists are not disadvantaged. But the
opposite is true of unsuccessful artists.
Supporters of the resale royalty right often try to offer alternative economic
justifications. For example, Thomas Goetzl argued, “The resale royalty is an
economic right and artists whose works sell in a secondary market ought to
benefit from that sale.”130 As he observed, in France, the prevailing argument
for the resale royalty right is that any increase in the value of an artwork is
primarily attributable to the efforts of the artist. In Germany, the prevailing
argument is that artists are entitled to share in the inherent “true value” of their
artwork.131 And in Belgium, the prevailing argument is based on the contract
principles of changed circumstances and unjust enrichment.132 Essentially, all
of these supposedly economic justifications rely on unjust enrichment. In other
words, they are equitable arguments dressed up as economic ones. But there is

Rub, supra note 94, at 1.
Id. at 3 (quoting Randall K. Filer, The “Starving Artist”—Myth or Reality? Earnings of Artists in
the United States, 94 J. POL. ECON. 56, 59 (1986)).
128 See Stephen E. Weil, Residue Royalties: Nobody Benefits, ARTNEWS, Mar. 1978, at 59.
129 Resale Royalties: An Updated Analysis, supra note 27, at 35 n.237 (observing that studies of
median and mean artist income “cannot account for artists who are unable to make a living in the
art field, and therefore self-identify in other sectors,” because they only count people who list
their “primary job” as “artist,” and “in 2010 roughly 264,000 U.S. workers had a ‘secondary’ job
as an artist — that is, they worked most of their weekly hours in another job” (quoting National
Endowment for the Arts, Artists and Arts Workers in the United States: Findings from the
American Community Survey (2005–2009))).
130 Goetzl, supra note 106, at 257.
131 Id. at 256 n.190.
132 Alderman, supra note 94, at 271.
126
127
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no reason to think the enrichment of the lucky buyer who managed to purchase
one of the few artworks that increased in value is in any way unjust, any more
than the loss experienced by the buyers who purchased artworks that decreased
in value is unjust.
In sum, under the economic theory, resale royalty rights are not justified,
because they cannot provide salient incentives to marginal artists, and therefore
are inefficient. But more troubling, they are inequitable by design, because they
can only benefit only the very few artists who achieve financial success.
[O]nly established artists are likely to benefit from the statute and
then only if their works were originally sold in the absence of the
royalty provision when potential buyers did not adjust their bid
prices downward to account for the royalty. According to the Art
Dealers Association, only about fifty living artists have a resale
market for their works, and ninety-nine percent of all art
depreciates in value. Thus, if the statute benefits anyone, it
benefits the select few who need protection the least.133
Adding insult to injury, resale royalty rights effectively transfer wealth from
unsuccessful artists to successful artists. The predicted effect of resale royalty
rights is to decrease prices on the primary market in order to offset the cost of
resale royalty rights on the secondary market. In other words, all artists selling
artwork will make less money up front, in order to provide a windfall to the
vanishingly few artists who hit the jackpot and become successful. “There is, of
course, nothing intrinsically wrong with improving the status of the well-off.
But there is a real problem when the price of making the well-off better-off is to
make the least well-off worse-off. This is the effect of compulsory profit
sharing.”134 In other words, the resale royalty right isn’t just inefficient, it’s also
a form of rent-seeking, which forces the poor to subsidize the rich.
C. THE RESALE ROYALTY RIGHT UNDER THE MORAL THEORIES OF COPYRIGHT

While the resale royalty right as traditionally implemented fares poorly under
the economic theory, it does better under the moral rights theories of copyright.
“On balance, it may be argued that European and other societies with natural
law traditions, which broadly recognize a moral obligation to authors apart from
the proprietary rights of copyright, are inherently more receptive to the resale
royalty, despite its shortcomings.”135
133
134
135

Bolch, Damon & Hinshaw, supra note 124, at 696.
Edelson, supra note 120, at 264.
Alderman, supra note 94, at 265 n.2.
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The Lockean natural right theory of copyright holds that authors have a
natural right to the fruits of their labor.136 Similarly, the resale royalty right
enables artists to claim a percentage of the future value of their artworks, which
would otherwise belong to the buyer, rather than the artist. If increases in the
value of an artwork are attributable to the artist’s labors or the intrinsic value of
the artwork, then perhaps under the natural rights theory the artist is entitled to
a claim on that increase in value. But resale royalty systems typically do not
require artists to show that they caused the increase in value of their artwork.
By contrast, the Kantian and Hegelian moral right theories of copyright hold
that authors have a moral right to control and benefit from the use of their
works of authorship, as an expression of their autonomy.137 Like the moral
rights of attribution and integrity, the resale royalty right establishes an enduring
connection between artists and their artworks. The rights of attribution and
integrity give artists the right to claim or disclaim authorship of their artworks.
The resale royalty right gives artists the right to claim a percentage of the sale
price of their works of authorship. These are rights in property that persist
even after its transfer, establishing an enduring connection between artists and
their artworks. But an economic interest in the resale price of an artwork does
not seem like the kind of autonomy interest contemplated by the Kantian and
Hegelian theories.
Tellingly, supporters of the resale royalty right typically do not rely on
Lockean, Kantian, or Hegelian arguments. Instead, they argue that artists have
an “equitable” right to claim a percentage of the resale price of their artworks,
because artists are entitled to share in the increase in the value of the works of
authorship they create. Opponents of the resale royalty right respond that the
buyer of an artwork takes a risk on the future value of that artwork and is
entitled to the proceeds of that risk.138
It is unclear why “equity” vis-à-vis artists and collectors necessarily cuts in
favor of artists. In particular, it is hard to see why “equity” cuts in favor of the
successful artists who stand to gain from the resale royalty right, when they
already benefit indirectly from the increase in the value of their artwork. As
Robert Scull reminded Robert Rauschenberg, the remarkable increase in the
value of Thaw implied a corresponding increase in not only the value of the
existing artworks that Rauschenberg had not yet sold, but also the artworks he
had not yet created. While Scull profited handsomely on the increase in value
See Menell, supra note 102.
See MERGES, supra note 95, at 68–101; Bussey, supra note 94, at 1094.
138 Resale Royalties: An Updated Analysis, supra note 27, at 33 (“In fact, critics of a resale royalty
also query why visual artists should have the right to ‘share in a collector’s profits if the value of
his art goes up, without having a corresponding obligation to compensate the collector for his
losses’ if the work’s value declines.”).
136
137
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of a single artwork, Rauschenberg stood to profit handsomely from the increase
in value of many artworks.
But what about equity vis-à-vis successful and unsuccessful artists? The
decision to become an artist is very risky. While the potential for profit is high,
the likelihood of success is vanishingly low, akin to buying a lottery ticket.
Presumably, we want to provide salient incentives for marginal artists to invest
in the creation of artworks. But as explained above, resale royalty rights cannot
provide salient incentives to marginal artists, only windfall gains to successful
artists, at the expense of unsuccessful artists.
V. EQUITABLE RESALE ROYALTIES
The only way to provide salient incentives to marginal artists is to mitigate
the risk associated with the choice to become an artist in the first place. Resale
royalty rights cannot achieve this goal, because by design they can only benefit
successful artists. But perhaps a resale royalty system could achieve this goal, by
distributing resale royalties to unsuccessful artists. This would use some of the
windfall profits associated with art world success to mitigate the risk associated
with choosing to become an artist.
Of course, supporters of the resale royalty right insist that equity requires it to
benefit the artists whose artworks increased in value: “The resale royalty was
never intended as welfare legislation.”139 But why? Why not rethink the resale
royalty right as a means of redistributing wealth from successful to unsuccessful
artists? Or why not rethink the resale royalty right as a resale royalty tax, used to
fund welfare legislation designed to benefit those who took a socially beneficial
risk by investing in the production of artwork, but were not successful?
A. INDIVIDUAL RESALE ROYALTY RIGHTS

As observed above, Congress could probably create a resale royalty system
based on a federal resale royalty right, consistent with its constitutional
authority. And it could make the resale royalty right an individual right, asserted
and collected by individuals. But the evidence suggests that individual resale
royalty rights are difficult or impossible for artists to actually enforce. And in
any case, a resale royalty system based on an individual resale royalty right
cannot be equitable, because it can only benefit successful artists at the expense
of unsuccessful artists.

139

Goetzl, supra note 106, at 258.
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B. EQUITABLE RESALE RIGHTS ORGANIZATIONS

As observed above, functional resale royalty systems typically rely on resale
royalty organizations.140 A resale royalty organization resembles a performing
rights organization like ASCAP, BMI, or SESAC, in that it collects resale
royalties and distributes them to its members. Performing rights organizations
enabled the creation of a functional performance rights licensing system by
using reducing transaction costs on individual copyright owners and users.
Likewise, resale royalty organizations enable the creation of a functional resale
royalty system by reducing transaction costs on the collection of resale
royalties.141 Artists join a resale royalty organization, which collects resale
royalties from auctioneers and dealers, and distributes those royalties to its
members pro rata less a fee. In other words, artists receive a proportional share
of the royalties collected.
While resale royalty organizations enable the creation of a functional resale
royalty system, they don’t make it equitable. If a resale royalty organization
distributes royalties pro rata, it perpetuates the same inequity that affects a resale
royalty system based on an individual resale royalty right: benefiting successful
artists at the expense of unsuccessful artists. In fact, it exacerbates the inequity
by enabling the creation of a functional resale royalty system and causing
collectors to discount the expected future value of artworks created.
But resale royalty organizations could create a more equitable resale royalty
system by distributing royalties per stirpes or progressively. In other words, a
resale royalty organization could distribute equal shares of the royalties collected
to all of its members, or distribute shares of the royalties collected only to its
unsuccessful members. Both of these options would make a resale royalty
system more equitable by allowing unsuccessful artists to benefit from resale
royalties. A per stirpes distribution would be mildly equitable, because it would
benefit all members of the resale royalty organization equally, regardless of
success. A progressive distribution would be more equitable, because it would
benefit the unsuccessful members of the organization, who are in need, rather
than the successful members, who are not.
Existing resale royalty organizations distribute royalties pro rata because they
assume that the resale royalty right is analogous to the performance right
granted by the Copyright Act: an individual right managed by the organization.
But that is not required. Artists could voluntarily join equitable resale rights
organizations, as a way of insuring themselves against the significant likelihood
140 See Resale Royalties: An Updated Analysis, supra note 27, at 13–20, 79; see also
FAWCETT ET AL., supra note 10, at 106–39.
141 See Resale Royalties: An Updated Analysis, supra note 27, at 13–20, 79; see also
FAWCETT ET AL., supra note 10, at 106–39.
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that they will not be successful. Of course, equitable resale royalty
organizations might not appeal to artists with higher risk tolerance. And artists
who became successful would have a strong incentive to leave an equitable
resale royalty organization for a pro rata resale royalty organization.
Equitable resale royalty organizations could mitigate these problems by
requiring artists to join early in their careers and form long-term agreements
with penalties for early termination. Congress could solve the problem by
requiring resale royalty organizations to distribute royalties on a per stirpes or
progressive basis. Resale royalties can exist only if Congress decides to create
them. If the purpose of the resale royalty right is to promote efficiency and
equity, then Congress should take those considerations into account if and
when it creates a resale royalty right. One way to accomplish that goal would be
to permit the collection of resale royalties only via an equitable resale royalty
organization.
C. THE RESALE ROYALTY TAX

Opponents of the resale royalty right often call it a tax, rather than a right.
“The term ‘resale royalty’ is a misnomer; the proposal is essentially calling for
mandatory profit-sharing, and constitutes a discriminatory surtax on the profit
from the sale of those works of art to which it applies.”142 They are correct.
The traditional resale royalty right is essentially a tax imposed on the sale of
certain artworks and distributed to a particular class of artists. It is also an
unusually regressive tax, because it benefits a small class of successful artists
who are entitled to collect resale royalties, at the expense of a vastly larger class
of unsuccessful artists who are not.
But if the resale royalty right is a tax, the government can collect and distribute
the resale royalty tax revenue however it chooses. Supporters of resale royalties
argue that they are intended to increase the efficiency and equity of the art
market. Congress is uniquely well positioned to create an efficient and equitable
resale royalty system by imposing a resale royalty tax on the secondary market for
artwork and distributing the revenues in an equitable fashion.
Traditional resale royalty systems essentially impose a sales tax on all
qualifying transactions, and distribute the proceeds either directly or indirectly
to the artist who created the artwork in question.143 Many states already impose
a sales tax on qualifying transactions, including sales of artwork. The resale
royalty tax is effectively an additional sales tax that applies to certain
Edelson, supra note 120, at 261.
See, e.g., Intellectual Property Code, Art. L122-8, http://perma.cc/38MU-W5N4, California
Resale Royalties Act, Cal. Civ. Code 986 (1976). While the CRRA only applies if an artwork has
increased in value, it still applies to the entire sales price, even if the increase in sale price is small.
142
143
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transactions. For example, the CRRA effectively imposes a 5% sales tax on art
transactions of in excess of $1,000, if the artwork has increased in value, and the
European Union droit de suite law effectively imposes a graduated sales tax on all
commercial sales of artwork in excess of €3,000, with a maximum tax of
€12,500.144
Traditional resale royalty systems are inefficient because they rely on private
enforcement, either by individual artists or by private resale royalty
organizations. Neither has direct access to financial information relating to
sales of artwork. At best they can pursue resale royalty taxes levied on auction
and commercial sales, but cannot effectively pursue resale royalty taxes on
private sales. The European Union resale royalty tax is especially inequitable
because it in regressive, effectively imposing a higher tax rate on low-value art
sales than on high-value art sales. And because the tax is capped, the highervalue the sale, the lower the effective tax rate.
Traditional resale royalty systems are also inequitable, because they benefit
successful artists at the expense of unsuccessful artists, and the more successful
the artist, the larger the financial benefit. In addition, they enable successful
artists to benefit every time an artwork they created is sold, often even if the
artwork has not increased, or even decreased in value. An equitable resale
royalty system would benefit unsuccessful artists, rather than successful artists.
D. METHODS OF IMPOSING A FEDERAL RESALE ROYALTY TAX

A federally managed resale royalty system could avoid these inefficiencies
and inequities. Congress could impose a resale royalty tax in many different
ways, but the two simplest solutions would be via a sales tax or a surcharge to
the capital gains tax.
First, Congress could create a federal resale royalty tax by simply imposing a
flat tax on all sales of artwork. This would require the creation of a new tax,
which would effectively be a form of national sales tax imposed on the sale of
artwork. Many state and local governments already impose sales taxes on most
transactions, including the sale of artwork, and the federal government imposes
federal sales taxes on the sale of certain goods, like gasoline, alcohol, and
cigarettes. There is no reason that Congress could not impose a federal sales
tax on sales of artwork, and require sellers to report any sales to the IRS.
Second, Congress could create a federal resale royalty tax by increasing the
capital gains tax on artwork. Artwork is already subject to the capital gains tax,
144 Council Directive 2001/84/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 27
September 2001 on the Resale Right for the Benefit of the Author of an Original Work of Art,
recital 3, 2001 O.J. (L 272) 32–36, http://www.wipo.int/wipolex/en/text.jsp?file_id=180301; see
also Resale Royalties: An Updated Analysis, supra note 27, at 13.
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like any other form of property, so it would not significantly increase the
administrative burden on the IRS or the tax preparation burden on taxpayers to
create a capital gains tax surcharge for artwork. Creating a federal resale royalty
tax through the capital gains tax would have the effect of only taxing increases
in the value on an artwork, and not taxing sales of artwork that had decreased in
value. However, it would probably also be easier for taxpayers to avoid or
minimize than a federal sales tax.
E. METHODS OF DISTRIBUTING FEDERAL RESALE ROYALTY TAX REVENUES
EQUITABLY

Once Congress decides how to impose a federal resale royalty tax, it must
decide how to distribute the revenue collected in an equitable fashion. There
are two obvious options: Congress could either distribute the revenue to a
federal agency or distribute it directly to unsuccessful artists.
F. DISTRIBUTING FEDERAL RESALE ROYALTY TAX REVENUES TO AN AGENCY

If Congress chooses to distribute the resale royalty tax revenue to a federal
agency, the obvious choice would be the National Endowment for the Arts
(NEA). Congress created the NEA in 1965, in order to promote progress and
scholarship in the humanities and the arts in the United States.145 The NEA
provides grant funding to art institutions and projects on the federal, state, and
local level. It is the largest public arts grant making institution in the United
States and has extensive institutional experience in administering public funds in
the public interest to promote the arts. It is perfectly situated to disburse the
revenue from a federal resale royalty tax in an equitable fashion.
In addition, it is an opportune time to create a dedicated source of tax
revenue to fund the NEA. While the NEA budget has changed over time, the
2016 NEA budget was $148 million.146 On March 16, 2017, President Trump
submitted his administration’s first budget request to Congress.147 Among
other things, the proposed budget eliminates all funding for the NEA in fiscal
year 2018.148 President Trump and members of his administration have stated
that the budget eliminates funding for the NEA because it is not appropriate to
ask taxpayers to support arts programs they do not consume.

National Foundation on the Arts and the Humanities Act of 1965 (P.L. 89-209).
NATIONAL ENDOWMENT FOR THE ARTS, https://www.arts.gov/ (last visited Mar. 30, 2017).
147 OFFICE OF MANAGEMENT AND BUDGET, AMERICA FIRST: A BUDGET BLUEPRINT TO MAKE
AMERICAN GREAT AGAIN (2017), https://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/whitehouse.gov/files/omb/
budget/fy2018/2018_blueprint.pdf.
148 NATIONAL ENDOWMENT FOR THE ARTS, https://www.arts.gov/ (last visited Mar. 30, 2017).
145
146
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A federal resale royalty tax could provide a revenue stream that would
replace or even increase the budget of the NEA. In 2015, the global art market
reported total sales of $63.8 billion, of which the United States accounted for
43% or $27.4 billion.149 Accordingly, a 1% federal resale royalty tax on federal
sales tax on the sale of artwork could generate as much as $274 million, or
about double the 2016 budget of the NEA. Notably, this is a considerably
lower rate than is imposed by most traditional resale royalty systems. If
Congress wanted to further increase the revenue available for arts funding, it
could impose a rate of 2% or 3%. It is harder to predict how much revenue
would be generated by an increase in the capital gains tax on artwork, but a
small increase would probably also be sufficient.
Historically, the NEA has been politically controversial. Conservative
politicians have objected to the content of artworks sponsored by the NEA,
and to its mission as “welfare for the cultural elite.”150 Using a federal resale
royalty tax to fund the NEA would have the salutary effect of providing a
dedicated revenue stream for federal arts funding, while imposing the tax
burden on those who consume art benefit directly from the consequences of
arts funding. Indeed, artists have long suggested a similar approach. For
example, artist William Powhida has observed that almost $1 billion in artwork
was sold at one auction at Christie’s in New York: “If you had a 2 percent tax
just on the auctions in New York you could probably double the NEA budget
in two nights.”151
G. DISTRIBUTING FEDERAL RESALE ROYALTY TAX REVENUES TO
UNSUCCESSFUL ARTISTS

If Congress chooses to distribute the federal resale royalty tax revenues
directly to unsuccessful artists, it also has several options. As discussed above,
Congress could require the federal resale royalty tax to be collected and
distributed by an equitable resale royalty organization. But this approach has
the disadvantages of potential inefficiency introduced by relying on private
organizations vulnerable to information costs to collect resale royalties, and
inequity introduced by the limited membership of such organizations. For
149 Alexander Forbes, The 10 Most Important Takeaways from the 2016 TEFAF Art Market Report,
ARTSY (Mar. 11, 2016, 12:00 PM), https://www.artsy.net/article/artsy-editorial-the-10-most-imp
ortant-takeaways-from-the-2016-tefaf-art-market-report.
150 See National Endowment for the Arts v. Finley, 524 U.S. 569 (1998); Kyle Munzenrieder,
Trump Vows to Defund the Arts: Here’s What Happens Next, WMAG (Mar. 16, 2017), http://
www.wmagazine.com/story/donald-trump-defunds-arts-organizations.
151 Neda Ulaby, In Pricey Cities, Being A Bohemian Starving Artist Gets Old Fast, NPR (May 5, 2015),
http://www.npr.org/2014/05/15/312779821/in-pricey-cities-being-a-bohemian-starving-artistgets-old-fast.
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example, equitable resale royalty organizations cannot effectively collect resale
royalties on private transactions.
And even equitable resale royalty
organizations will be imperfectly equitable, because unsuccessful artists can
receive distributions only if they are members of the organization.
The federal government could probably administer a resale royalty system
more efficiently and equitably itself, using the tax code and the administrative
capacity of the Internal Revenue Service (IRS). The IRS has access to
information about taxpayer financial transactions that private parties do not, as
well as the means to distribute federal resale royalty tax revenues more equitably
across a broader range of taxpayers.
For example, the IRS could distribute the federal resale royalty tax revenues
to taxpayers who filed a tax return claiming income as an independent artist.
Taxpayers who operate a business as an “independent artist” must file a Form
1040 Schedule C, “Profit or Loss from Business (Sole Proprietorship)” to
report income and loss from that business.152 Taxpayers are required to prepare
a separate Schedule C for each of their businesses.153 Schedule C requires
taxpayers to identify the “Principal business or profession, including product or
service” for which it is filed and to provide the appropriate “Principal Business
or Professional Activity Code” from the Instructions for Schedule C.154 Under
the heading “Arts, Entertainment, & Recreation” appears the code “711510
Independent artists, writers, & performers.”155
Of course, the scope of the existing code category is slightly overbroad. The
resale royalty right is typically understood to extend to artists, but not
necessarily writers and performers.156 However, the definition of “artist” in
contemporary art has expanded and probably includes at least some writers and
performers. In any case, the IRS could easily break “independent artists” out
into a separate category, and allow taxpayers to determine whether their
business fits into that category.
The IRS could distribute the revenue from the resale royalty tax in a variety of
ways. Probably the simplest would be to provide a per stirpes tax credit to all
taxpayers who filed a Schedule C for a sole proprietorship as an independent
artist. Of course, this method would be sub-optimally equitable, as the tax credit
would go to both successful and unsuccessful artists. The IRS could also provide
2016 Instructions for Schedule C, C-17, INTERNAL REVENUE SERV. (Oct. 25, 2016), http://
www.irs.gov/pub/irs-pdf/i1040SC.pdf.
153 Id.
154 Id.
155 Id.
156 See Resale Royalties: An Updated Analysis, supra note 27, at 32 (attributing the need for the
resale royalty right specifically to visual artists because “without a resale royalty, many if not most
visual artists will not realize a benefit proportional to the success of their work”).
152
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the tax credit only to those taxpayers whose Schedule C shows a loss. For several
reasons however, this would not solve the equity problem. First, a single year
Schedule C filing may not accurately reflect the overall level of an artist’s success.
Highly successful artists may show a loss in one year’s filing, and vice versa.
Furthermore, it could encourage tax arbitrage to collect the credit.
The IRS could also make the tax credit progressive by tying it to a taxpayer’s
overall return. In other words, the IRS could allocate the tax credit to taxpayers
who file a Schedule C for a sole proprietorship as an independent artist who
report total taxable income under a certain level. Additionally, the IRS could
allocate the largest tax credit to the taxpayers with the lowest incomes, with the
credit phasing out as taxpayer income reaches the cutoff.
Of course, all of these approaches suffer from the defect that they can only
distribute the resale royalty tax to artists who choose to itemize their
deductions, who are disproportionately likely to be more successful and higher
income taxpayers. Even if the IRS adopts a progressive approach to
distributing the resale royalty tax credit, relying on Schedule C filings to identify
artists will necessarily preclude distribution of the credit to the least successful
and most deserving artists.
Accordingly, the IRS should consider relying on taxpayer self-identification
as an artist independent of Schedule C filing. For example, the IRS could
include a check box on all of the 1040 forms, asking taxpayers if they consider
themselves artists, along the lines of the existing check box for the Presidential
Election Campaign Fund. While this would be a significant change in the
administration of the federal income tax, it is not entirely unprecedented. For
example, federal income tax law currently allows qualified performing artists to
deduct performing-arts-related expenses.157 To further increase the granularity
and equity of the resale royalty tax credit, the IRS could ask taxpayers how
many artists reside in their household. After all, taxpayers who are not artists
themselves may have dependents who are artists. It would be unfair to deny
the credit to taxpayers who are supporting artists. Of course, this expanded
credit could also be distributed on a per stirpes or progressive basis, with a
preference for the latter.

157

IRS Form 1040, Line 24 (2016).

https://digitalcommons.law.uga.edu/jipl/vol24/iss2/2

38

Frye: Equitable Resale Royalties

2017]

EQUITABLE RESALE ROYALTIES

275

IRS Form 1040, President Election Campaign Fund Checkoff (2016)
Of course, some advocates of the resale royalty right may object to such an
agnostic approach because it rewards people who are not truly artists. But in the
postmodern age of contemporary art, who is to say who is and who is not an
artist? After all, contemporary art is primarily about appropriation, and
contemporary artists appropriate works from all manner of sources, including
authors not typically considered part of the art world.158 Moreover, it is certainly
consistent with the longstanding aesthetic nondiscrimination principle of
copyright law, which provides that copyright protection is not and cannot be
conditioned on the aesthetic value of a work of authorship. If a pictorial work of
authorship is protected by copyright, is it not an artwork? On that definition, the
overwhelming majority of artworks are produced by artists who are not and never
will be part of the art world: the artists who sell their artworks at craft fairs and on
street corners; the designers who create advertisements; floral arrangers and
interior decorators; high school students drawing in their notebooks; employees
doodling during meetings; toddlers scribbling with crayons. All of these people
and innumerable more create visual works of authorship, or “artworks.”
While one may well dismiss the aesthetic value of many of those works, the de
gustibus principle holds that any such aesthetic judgments should be irrelevant
under the law.159 Moreover, much of contemporary art exists in relation to the
rejection or transcendence of aesthetic values. Duchamp objected to the
aestheticization of his readymades, not necessarily because they lacked aesthetic
values, but because it missed the point.160 And today, aestheticism is an ironic
gesture, deployed in a dialectic with its rejection. The cynicism of contemporary
See, e.g., Adler, supra note 88.
See generally Brian L. Frye, Aesthetic Nondiscrimination & Fair Use, LAW FACULTY SCHOLARLY
ARTICLES, Paper 587 (2016), http//uknowledge.Uky.edu/law_fapur/587.
160 Adler, supra note 88, at 601 (citing ARTHUR C. DANTO, AFTER THE END OF ART:
CONTEMPORARY ART AND THE PALE OF HISTORY 16 (1997)).
158
159
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art feeds on the sincerity it purports to reject.161 If contemporary art needs the
vernacular, why shouldn’t the resale royalty right subsidize vernacular art?

Marcel Duchamp, Fountain (1917)
VI. CONCLUSION
If the United States decides to create a federal resale royalty system, it
should ensure that the system is efficient and equitable. Existing resale royalty
systems are neither. They are inefficient because they do not provide salient
incentives to marginal artists, and they are inequitable because they benefit
successful artists at the expense of unsuccessful artists. However, it is possible
to create a resale royalty system that is both efficient and equitable by collecting
a federal resale royalty tax and distributing the revenue either to the NEA or
directly to unsuccessful artists.

See generally id. (criticizing the fair use doctrine’s emphasis on transformativeness in light of
the necessity of copying in art).
161
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